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M A R I N A  A N T I C  
Rodolphe Gasché characterizes Jacques Derrida’s The Other Heading: 
Reflections on Today’s Europe as “an effort that is clearly intent on 
disputing the New Right’s formulation of European identity,” an 
identity based on “cultural self-sufficiency and a nervous nationalism, 
as has been the case with the French New Right.” The occasion for The 
Other Heading, however, is to be found in the apparent European return 
to itself in the aftermath of 1989. Derrida writes:  
‘Reunion’ is today an official word. It belongs to the code of French cultural 
politics in Europe. Ministerial speeches and documents make great use of it; 
they help explain a remark of François Mitterrand, the President of the 
Republic, who said (perhaps while also presiding over the European 
Community) that Europe ‘is returning in its history and its geography like one 
who is returning home’ [chez soi]. (8)  
The jubilant “reunion” has since, of course, become the cumbersome 
reality of Western Europe taking on “the burden in the East,” reluctantly 
and with many reservations accepting former communist countries one 
by one into its circle. Disregarding for the moment the somewhat ugly 
reality of this forecasted “reunion,” we should ask ourselves what it 
means to foreground this important moment in the relationship of 
Western Europe to Eastern Europe in an essay challenging the very 
notion of identity in general and European identity in particular. What 
effect, if any, would an Eastern European perspective have on the 
arguments in such an essay? Can we locate Eastern Europe in the text 
that is occasioned by its apparent meld into a common European 
identity? What effect, if any, do Derrida’s claims in The Other Heading 
have on Eastern Europe and its identity? 




In searching for answers to these questions I will also attempt to 
answer a more fundamental problem in reading Derrida’s The Other 
Heading from an Eastern European or, more precisely, Balkan 
perspective: Is there common ground between Derrida’s interrogation of 
identity in general and European identity in particular and the critique 
of Europe posed by Balkan intellectuals over the past twenty years? This 
question is a reformulation of R. Radhakrishnan’s line of argument in 
“Postmodernism and the Rest of the World” where he asks: “Is there 
common cause between the interrogation of modernity within the 
developed world and Third World critiques of modernity? Are there 
sharable issues, agendas and objectives between these two constituencies 
despite the fundamental asymmetry that sustains East–West 
relationships?” (308). Therefore, what follows is, in short, an application 
of Radhakrishnan’s argument in “Postmodernism and the Rest of the 
World” to a Derridean (dis)engagement with Eastern Europe. In that 
sense, it is an exercise of sorts, an attempt at applying achievements in 
postcolonial theory to the reality of Eastern Europe and as such 
represents less an original contribution than an attempt at redirecting 
our understanding of Derrida’s and Radhakrishnan’s arguments from 
an Eastern European perspective. In addition, I use Alexander Kiossev’s 
argument about Balkan identity as an example of a way we can perceive 
Eastern European (or at least Balkan) identities that does not fit the 
Derridean mold. As one final caveat, then, I note that I subscribe to 
Kiossev’s argument only provisionally and present it here more for the 
sake of demonstrating the fallacy of Derrida’s view than for the sake of 
arguing for its validity per se. 
Derrida’s argument for salvaging the idea of Europe (or European 
identity) centers on the possibility that Europe can be understood as “the 
opening onto a history for which the changing of the heading, the relation 
to the other heading, or to the other of the heading, is experienced as 
always possible” (17). The “heading” Derrida speaks of is, first, an idea 
of Europe as a heading, a cape, an appendix to the Asian body (21) and, 
secondly, a heading that is not Europe, that is, other to Europe, but one 
that is in its otherness also constitutive of European identity. In other 
words, on the one hand, Derrida recalls the structures of imagination 
that identify Europe as a heading: “an advanced point of exemplarity,” a 
“figure of the Western heading and of the final headland or point,” “a 
heading for the universal essence of humanity.” On the other, in claiming 
that “what is proper to culture is to not be identical to itself,” Derrida 
establishes the significance of the (colonial) other in the notion of the 




(European) self. This is what Gasché calls a difference with itself “that 
derives from identity’s continual reference to the identity of other 
cultures over and against whom any self-identity is established” (126). 
Regarding this formulation of the heading of the other, Derrida 
redefines European identity as a radical responsibility for itself, that is 
to say, a necessity of Europeans reminding themselves of the heading of 
the other, “before which we must respond, and which we must remember, 
of which we must remind ourselves” (15). This necessity of reminding 
themselves of the other is fundamental to the new Europe Derrida 
imagines, a Europe beyond Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism, a 
Europe that is the very possibility of changing the heading and the 
relationship to the heading of the other.  
At the same time, I would add, the notion that it is necessary to 
remind yourself of the other is a decidedly European notion, and an 
“old” European notion at that. For the other or, more precisely, the 
European other (the other of Europe) is precisely the very impossibility of 
this “remembering” or “reminding.” The (post)colonial subject cannot 
“remind” herself of an “other” precisely because she has no “other” that 
is not ever-present in her notion of self. One can, naturally, remind 
oneself of something only if that something is absent. (Post)colonial 
identity, however, always presupposes the presence of the European and 
his “otherness” from the native.[1]  
The same holds true for Balkan identity. To identify oneself as 
Balkan means precisely to identify oneself over and against Europe, the 
Western heading, the heading for the universal essence of humanity. In 
such a process of identification Europe does not occupy a space of just 
any other culture over and against which one defines oneself – it occupies 
the space of the universal, the essential.  
Further, Europe’s imagination of the self as a heading, and especially 
as the heading for the universal essence of humanity, is not only an 
epistemological structure. Nor is it only implicated in the history of 
modernity and colonialism, in the sense that modernity or colonialism 
have tainted its meaning. More fundamentally, this structure of Europe’s 
imagination is part and parcel of Europe’s colonial, material history. 
Identification and relationship of oneself to an other does not, after all, 
happen in a vacuum, but is conditioned by history. The fact that Europe 
“knew” the other through dominance cannot, therefore, be erased by an 
epistemological break from this history alone.[2] The fact that Balkan 
identity is always already reminded of this material and 
epistemological dominance is not mere provincialism or a wounded 




sense of marginality. Rather, it is a reflection of the empirical conditions 
that, at least in part, determine or have historically determined local 
knowledges and identifications. 
However, the process of Balkan identifications is also more complex 
than this. Within the space dominated by the West and the Western gaze, 
Balkan identity also captures what we can call an understanding of the 
self through a series of reflected gazes: West to East and back. In other 
words, the Balkan self comes into being and exists in the space in-
between East and West so that what it means to be Balkan has meaning 
only within the realm of reflected perceptions and self-perceptions, not 
any stable, geographically or philosophically fixed phenomena. In this, 
the Balkan self is never separate from the European gaze and Europe is 
thus never absent from the Balkan self-identification. 
Alexander Kiossev details this process of self-identification through 
a Lacanian prism in “The Dark Intimacy: Maps, Identities, Acts of 
Identification.” He argues that the Western perception of the Balkans – a 
discourse known as (Western) Balkanism – was of critical importance in 
the mapping of identities in the Balkans. The cultures of the official 
Balkan nation states have “for decades, if not centuries, attempted to 
escape the image of the ‘dark Balkans’” (180). There were persistent 
attempts at differentiating oneself from others in national and cultural 
discourses of the Balkan nation-states, but these attempts always 
encountered the uncompromising Western gaze intent on erasing any 
signs of difference, perceiving the region “from a macro-colonial 
perspective.” As a result: 
Internalizing both the emotional trauma of non-recognition (public and 
historical invisibility) and the moral one (failure to fulfill the supposed historical 
duty), the ideologies and high cultures of South European nations have always 
harbored an obsessive concern. They tried to compensate for their geo-political 
and geo-cultural irrelevance with certain ideological self-representations. [...] 
Thus, for the national ideologies of the Balkan countries, different as they were, 
the Balkans also had a hidden, dark, mythological aura. [It] signifies the melting 
and disappearance of the national subjectivity before the gaze of the ‘Significant 
Other.’ [...] Being a traumatic mirror-discourse, the ‘native’ Balkanism seems to 
share the same stigmatizing series of predicates as the Western one but 
associates them with different emotional nuances: at times, anger and 
aggression against the Significant Other; at times, with failure and shame, even 
self-disgust. (180-82) 
The Balkan identity thus fluctuates from non-recognition and irrelevance 
to native ideological self-representations as stages of a “mirror-
discourse.” The flux Kiossev sees between the Lacanian mirror stage and 




the symbolic stage (“static forms of symbolic ‘identity’ are not 
permanently fixed, signifiers (identity models) float and change, 
libidinal investments and acts of identification continue”) he then 
applies to the cultural sphere and perceives a dialectical exchange in the 
formation of Balkan identity. 
The imposition of a “stable” identity onto the Balkans, whether that 
imposition comes from within or from the West, produces two major 
forms of identification: “the first option is to leave, to escape, to cast off 
the unbearable ‘armor’ of the imposed identities”; the second, an escape 
into “passionate nationalism and hyperbolic pride” (182). It becomes 
clear, then, that stable identities imposed from without or ideological 
self-representations fueled by the disappearance of national subjectivity 
before the European gaze invoke different identifications intent on 
answering or challenging this “traumatic mirror-discourse.” What is 
also quite clear from Kiossev’s argument is that the resultant Balkan 
identity is never separate or formed without not only the presence of 
Europe, but also a self-conscious awareness of that presence. 
This example of the Balkan processes of identification hopefully 
clarifies why to insist on the necessity of reminding oneself (as a 
European) of the other is to reaffirm Europe’s dominance in this 
refraction of identities across East–West boundaries. To “remind” 
yourself of the other is, at the same time, to reclaim the privileged 
position of an identity that believes it has a choice to be defined or not 
defined by others, regardless of whether such an ideological position is 
actually sustainable or not.  
But Derrida also speaks of Europe as a possibility of an opening to 
the other of the heading. This is what Gasché calls an internal difference 
of “any identity not from the state of non-identity, from which it had to 
be wrenched, but with a ‘state’ anterior to the difference of identity and 
non-identity” (126). Gasché paraphrases this part of Derrida’s argument 
in the following way: 
But [Europe] must further recall, and recall itself to that which, while not being 
its opposite – headlessness, and a drifting without direction – is no longer of the 
order of the head and of a heading, but is the very thing from and thanks to 
which the binary opposition of heading and the other heading, of self and other, 
of identity and non-identity, can distinguish their meaning. (127-28)  
In other words, that which makes identification possible but is itself 
beyond identity and non-identity alike is another necessary “other,” of 
which Europe must remind itself and to which it must aspire in self-
identification. Where does this need for an ultimate “other” – the other of 




Identity for which Europe ultimately stands as the supreme example – 
come from? Why is the new Europe Derrida aspires to in The Other 
Heading tied to the notion of a beyond identity and non-identity?  
For one, Derrida claims that “Old Europe seems to have exhausted 
all the possibilities of discourse and counter-discourse about its own 
identification” (26). In other words, for Europe the discourse of identity 
(and non-identity) seems to hold little promise. Further, however, 
Derrida claims that the rejection of this apparently exhausted discourse 
of identity applies to “identification in general”: 
Dialectic in all its essential forms, including those that comprehend and entail 
anti-dialectic, has always been in the service of this autobiography of Europe, 
even when it took on the appearance of a confession. For avowal, guilt, and self-
accusation no more escape this old program than does the celebration of self. 
Perhaps identification in general, the formation and affirmation of an identity, 
self-presentation, the self-presence of identity [...] always has a capital form, the 
figurehead [figure de proue] of the advanced point, and of capitalizing reserve. 
(26-7) 
Before engaging the notion of this state anterior to identity and non-
identity, I must first comment on Derrida’s universalization of his 
argument to include all identity. The above argument about the radical 
responsibility new Europe will take on hinges on the observation that the 
avowal, guilt and self-accusation Europe has purportedly hurled upon 
itself in recognition of its sordid history is as impotent and self-serving 
as its glorification. In terms of a philosophical redefinition of the 
European self, this might hold up as a valid argument. And perhaps in 
terms of European self-perception, this avowal, guilt and self-accusation 
do not, in fact, promise a future for Europe. But, in terms of those on 
behalf of whom Europe experiences this guilt and self-accusation (the other 
heading), the difference between self-criticism and celebration of the self 
is immeasurable. Imagine if this guilt and self-accusation were actually 
allowed to take root – they might just have produced an agreement, a 
European agreement to forgive the Third World debt and pay 
reparations to Africa. This, I propose, would for once not be the same 
“old program.”[3]  
But within Europe proper, the dialectic and the anti-dialectic, 
according to Derrida, have played out their roles, serving Europe in its 
innumerable autobiographies at the expense of the other. Let us, for the 
sake of argument, take this as true, namely that the dialectic (and anti-
dialectic) has nothing to say to Europe any longer and that all its 
programs have all been played out ad nauseam. Let us also assume that 




identification based on these programs has long proven to be impotent in 
Europe. How does this translate into a claim that identification in 
general is also implicated in this proverbial beating of a dead horse? 
It is unlikely that Derrida made a typically European error of 
generalizing from a European reality onto a universal realm. Rather, a 
structure of domination that is much harder to pinpoint and eliminate 
than a simple error of prejudice or Eurocentrism is on display here. R. 
Radhakrishnan speaks to this structure of domination as follows: 
Given the avant-gard-ism of the West, it is only inevitable that the very 
regionality of western forms will travel the world over as dominant-universal 
forms. In other words, western realities have the power to realize themselves as 
‘general human conditions.’ The passage from specific reality to a general condition 
is effected through the mediation of knowledge and epistemology. [...] It is the 
ability of the developed world to conceptualize and theorize its particular – 
organic empirical reality into a cognitive-epistemic formula on behalf of the 
entire world that poses a dire threat to other knowledges. [...] Thus a report on 
the epistemology elaborated in the metropolis either begins to speak for the 
human condition the world over or assumes a virtual reality to be devoutly 
wished for by the rest of the world (308). 
That is to say, Derrida’s projection of a hypothesized European reality 
(the overused, impotent dialectic and anti-dialectic) becomes a matter of 
a cognitive-epistemic formula on behalf of the entire world, namely: 
identity as such should be abandoned for identification in general is an 
impotent, “traditional discourse of modernity” (28). After all, how could 
anyone still be interested in modernity, the source and rationale for the 
domination of much of the world by the European? The interrogation of 
identity Derrida takes up here is, thus, always already determined when 
it reaches the Third World, the Third World has no say in its 
“theorization into lexical significance” and it thus becomes a general 
human condition, not least because of the location where such theorizing 
takes place. The lingering question of whether it is still possible to find 
common cause between Derrida’s critique of European structures of 
identity and the Third World’s critique of the same despite these power 
dynamics will be addressed later.  
Derrida argues further that his vision of a new Europe is a new type 
of responsibility: “Identity would thus be instituted in responsibility, 
which is to say – and we will come back to this – in a certain experience 
and experiment of the response that here bears the whole enigma” (52-3). 
The responsibility in question is the responsibility to, for and before the 
European identity’s claim to universality – precisely because it was in 
the name of Europe that the concept of universality appears. To claim 




responsibility in such a radical sense (opening oneself not only to the 
other but to the other of identity itself) is especially effective in the sense 
that Derrida’s reworking of European identity does not abandon 
Europe’s epistemological burden toward the other. As Gasché says:  
Indeed, to use the name ‘Europe’ as a denomination for the responsibility in 
question is to engage the Europeans, first and foremost, in that responsibility. 
Calling it by that name is a performative, a first singularization of this 
responsibility, one that is binding and that calls European to respond to its call 
insofar as they are European, that is, the inheritors of a mode of thinking that 
sought universality from the start (143). 
However, Derrida’s project does not end here. He goes on to argue that 
the claim to universality is paradoxical in two ways: first, as it is “no 
less constitutive of the essential or constitutive traits of French 
consciousness” and secondly, because this feeling of “being ‘men of 
universality’” is not reserved for the French or Europeans, but extends to 
all forms of identification. Indeed, Derrida writes that:  
Whether it takes a national form or not, a refined, hospitable or aggressively 
xenophobic form or not, the self-affirmation of an identity always claims to be 
responding to the call or assignation of the universal. There are no exceptions to 
this law. No cultural identity presents itself as the opaque body of an 
untranslatable idiom, but always, on the contrary as the irreplaceable inscription 
of the universal in the singular, the unique testimony to the human essence and 
to what is proper to man (73). 
This is how Derrida extends his argument about the processes of 
European identification onto all claims to identity. And as we have seen 
earlier, identification, according to Derrida, also always involves not 
only the self, but consciously or not, the other and the other of the 
self/other division. But, unlike Gasché, who sees in this no imposition 
upon the other (131), I argue that Derrida here fails to see how, first, his 
argument is necessarily imposed upon the other and, second, how his 
claims about identity and identification actually reaffirm the European 
irresponsibility toward the other. 
As mentioned earlier, due to the geo-historical situatedness of 
Derrida’s argument, it is almost impossible to write from a theoretical 
position in Europe without running the risk that the “report on the 
epistemology elaborated in the metropolis [will] either begin to speak for 
the human condition the world over or assume a virtual reality to be 
devoutly wished for by the rest of the world.” But once the conclusions of 
the critique actually extend to all identification, as in our example, this 
possibility of an imposition upon the other becomes a reality. Because 




theory elaborated in the center, under economic and material 
circumstances of European (or Western) dominance of the world, tends 
to reaffirm the dominance of Western episteme at the expense of local 
knowledges, Derrida’s claims about identity actually reaffirm European 
hegemony in both epistemological and material terms. Further, 
proclaiming all identity, without exception, to be implicated in this will 
to universality, without input from “the other shore,” without even a 
consideration of the closest example – the one that occasioned his essay – 
namely, Eastern Europe, is the prolongation of the irresponsibility with 
which Europe has thought of itself for centuries.  
Again taking the example of the Balkans, I argue that Derrida’s 
vision of the radical openness to the other (and to the other of the 
identity/non-identity division) as a model for identification is not borne 
out by the example of his analysis, nor is it applicable to identity in 
general. And neither is the claim that every self-affirmation of identity is 
always a response to the call or assignation of the universal. 
Above I quoted Kiossev’s analysis of Balkan identity and the 
responses to the imposition of “stable” identities through two common 
forms of (dis)identification: an escape, a “radical emigration, close to 
cultural amnesia”; and a retreat into hyperbolic nationalism. But 
Kiossev very insightfully notices an opening in the “Balkan patchwork 
and the above-mentioned cognitive dynamics” that while discrediting 
the national, the European and the universal also allows for “the 
contemporary everyday life of the peninsula [to] repeatedly display the 
old-new plethora of pre-modern, modern, and post-modern similarities 
and differences” (184). His argument can be summarized as follows. 
Society and culture in the Balkans (and presumably beyond) create a 
lot of opportunities for identification. (Identification, for Kiossev, is that 
moment of recognition of the self in (an) other, regardless of whether that 
recognition is an occasion for joy or sorrow.[4]) At the same time, society 
tries in various ways to force the individual or a group to assume a 
certain “stable” identity, a rigid structure, a fixed and stable totality. In 
the dynamic flux of identity (stable, rigid, national) and identification 
(“a-ha” moments) we are faced with a lot of overlapping cognitive maps 
and a multitude of possible or actual identities with competing cognitive 
strategies. In such a context, the acts of individual identification are 
performed not against stable identities but rather they take place in an 
unstable field, where various identity models are competing, 
contradicting and transforming one another. In the Balkans, this field 
consists roughly of pre-modern identities, Western perceptions of Balkan 




identities and self-representations (national or otherwise). Individuals 
can choose among the dominant identity models (escaping the Balkans 
in disgust or retreating into rabid nationalism), but the Balkan 
patchwork also opens a free space for them to react differently: to have 
multiple “a-ha” experiences, alternative identifications and counter-
identifications, etc.  
What Kiossev goes on to call “a new type of arrogant Balkan 
intimacy” indicative of this Balkan patchwork is best captured in the 
nostalgic, but ironic and at times taunting, tone of Emir Kusturica’s 
films.[5] Characters whose violence, sexuality, cruelty, uncontrolled 
passion, barbarism, ignorance, and arrogance seem to outdo the very 
stereotypes that identify them as such help create a cinematic Balkan 
world speaking to both the imposed “stable” identities and the 
rebellious identifications over and against such identities.  
Take, for example, one of the last scenes from Underground, where 
against the backdrop of a fanatical ethnic war, a conversation takes 
place between a United Nations “blue helmet” representative and the 
character Blacky. We have just learned that Blacky is on a murderous, 
fanatical mission of killing or capturing enemies from all sides: Ustashe, 
Chetniks, UN personnel, and last but not least war profiteers. The UN 
representative addresses Blacky: 
- Protestujem gospodine! (I protest, sir!)   
- I ja protestujem dru!e! (I also protest, comrade!)   
- Nisam ja drug gospodine. (I am not a ‘comrade’, sir.)   
- Nisam ni ja gospodin dru!e. (I am not a ‘sir’ either, comrade.)   
- Ko ste vi: usta!a, "etnik, partizan? (What are you? An ustasha, a chetnik, a 
partisan?)  
- Ja sam Petar Popara Crni. (I am Petar Popara Blacky.)   
- Kojoj vojsci pripadate dru!e? (To which army do you belong?)   
- Mojoj. (My own.)   
- Ima li neko iznad vas? (Is there anyone above you in rank?)   
- Ima, moja zemlja. Jebem li ti mater fa!isti"ku. (There is. My country. Fascist 
motherfucker.)  
 
Blacky firing at “all enemies.”      Blacky and the UN “blue helmet” speak. 
 




 “There is. My country.” 
Blacky knocks out his opponent, Balkan style.  
Blacky’s violence is both an intensified version of the Western stereotype 
of the Balkans and an embodiment of the despair from which a rejection 
of this imposed identification arises. His refusal to adapt to the reality of 
the jubilant “transition” to Europe evident from his insistence on being 
addressed as “comrade” is characterized both by his (dis)identification 
from the newly imposed ethnic realities and his refusal of Western codes 
of conduct. Compare Blacky’s verbal and physical defiance in the face of 
imposed identities to earlier responses to the same problem of Balkan 
identities in scores of Ivo Andri ’s “small people,” whose lives hint at 
defiance only by their mute insignificance.[6] Kiossev explains Blacky’s 
behavior and the popular identification with his character in the 
following way: 
[A] Balkan popular (counter) culture was born in all the Balkan countries: a new 
mass taste for the old belly dance developed, [...] a new type of arrogant Balkan 
intimacy haunted the air. The most important symptom of this process was the 
lack of popular will to be Western-like (a rejection of not only the current 
political slogan ‘on the way to Europe,’ but also of the old Balkan perception of 
the West as a kind of secular transcendence). [...] It turns the lowermost picture 
of the Balkans upside down and converts the stigma into a joyful consumption 
of pleasures, forbidden by European norms and taste (184-5).  
This is the opening in the aforementioned Balkan cognitive dynamics of 
identifications and the strongest argument against Derrida’s claim that 
to overcome the exhausted discourses of identification, a new radical 
openness to the other of identity and non-identity is necessary. For the 
Balkan “cognitive dynamics” the question of identity is not a question of 
overcoming the dialectical exchange between self and other or identity 
and non-identity precisely because the identifications and 
(dis)identifications in the Balkans are rooted in the exchange of 
identities across the East-West boundary, not within them. The European 
can and does identify himself within a space that is at least ideologically 




constructed as closed off from the other. The Balkan states could not 
sustain this ideological claim to a stable, differentiated identity. As 
Kiossev says “the ideologies and high cultures of South European 
nations have always harbored an obsessive concern” about their 
authenticity and difference precisely because the intrusion of Europe (in 
the form of a material and critical knowledge of the Balkans from a 
colonial perspective) could not be successfully hidden in nationalist 
claims. That is to say, even when celebratory of national identities, the 
Balkanites are always already also disappointed with them. Identity is 
always already challenged in the Balkans, not least because of its 
position towards the stable even if negative European self-
identifications. Because of this, it never took on the simplistic forms of 
celebration or self-avowal as two poles of its identity, and thus, the 
proposed escape from these structures does not correspond to the reality 
in the region.  
While other intellectuals have struggled with understanding and 
stabilizing this marginal identity, Kusturica’s expression of this 
contemporary popular trend in Balkan identifications represents, for the 
Balkans, an opening akin to what Derrida imagines for the European.[7] 
What this new Balkan identification offers is a way of taking 
responsibility for and before the Balkan “identity” recognizing both the 
internal and external impositions of such an identity but also moving 
beyond the exhausted nationalist rhetoric or self-imposed cultural 
amnesia. In this, perhaps, is one point of common interest: namely, to 
move beyond our current patterns of identification in both Europe and 
the Balkans. 
But, unlike Europe, the Balkans cannot and should not define 
themselves as a “sentiment of this necessity that all claims to identity 
and universality require [... an opening ] to [something] other than the 
opposition of the Western and the non-Western” (Gasché 144). For, the 
Balkans, willingly or not, already occupy a space where the Western and 
the non-Western are demystified as a series of reflected gazes. To be 
Balkan today is precisely to acknowledge these hegemonic, constructed 
identities and rather than finding a “third” way beyond them and their 
negations, engage them to the point of absurdity. This is perhaps the only 
way to disarm them from a marginal position.  
The significance of these observations about Balkan identities to 
Derrida’s new Europe is not immediately apparent. Beyond being an 
empirical example of a counterargument, the Balkan case also shows 
that Derrida himself fails to open up the very text (in which he professes 




such a radical openness to the other) to the other of the European 
understanding of identity, namely that of Eastern Europe. The absence of 
Eastern Europe in the text is, in fact, glaring. Is the radical responsibility 
for and to the other just another example of what Radhakrishnan so 
correctly described as an impotence of the self-critical West? 
“Withdrawing from its sorry history of knowing the Other through 
dominance, a self-critical Eurocentrism abandons the Other altogether in 
the name of non-interference. [...] The Other becomes the burden of the 
Self’s negativity, a negativity produced by the Self through its own 
autocritical – deconstructive engagement with itself” (309).  
Perhaps Derrida would argue that his insistence on engaging with 
identity as such and asserting that any self-identification carries with it 
a claim to universality does in fact incorporate or bring the Other into 
the realm of his argument and perhaps even into a relationship with 
Europe that is not one of dominance. For, if all identities do, in fact, 
suffer from this claim to the universal, Derrida’s argument might be of 
benefit to them as well. But the claim that any self-identification is 
always already a claim to hegemony or universality is itself suspect. 
Again, let us take the example Derrida chose not to engage: the Balkans. 
Can we say that a Balkan identity is always already a response to the 
call or assignation of the universal? 
For Derrida, identity can either be a “response to the call of the 
universal” or a presentation of itself as “an opaque body of 
untranslatable idiom” (73). But, in reality, the field of identifications is 
usually much more complex than this and claims neither universality 
nor untranslatability. The “new” Balkan identity evident in Kusturica’s 
films or Goran Bregovi#’s music or a host of other popular 
identifications arises not as a claim to the universal, but as a challenge to 
identities that map themselves out from nation to Europe to the 
universal. This new popular consciousness does not celebrate its new 
identity as anything standing on its own, outside of a complex web of 
relationships to the West and East and thus claiming exemplarity and 
universality. Rather, it celebrates, perhaps too jovially, the perception of 
the Balkans “as they are: backward and Oriental, corporeal and semi-
rural, rude, funny, but intimate” (Kiossev, 185). But it is also not “an 
opaque untranslatable idiom.” In fact, it is the most translatable, the 
most understandable of all Balkan identities so far because it speaks 
from within the space imagined by the West, in the West’s idiom, even if 
only to “scandalize the ‘civilizational standards’” all the while 
retaining all of the characteristics of a “Balkan neighborhood.” The 




result is a “trickster-like, comic, and aggressive transformation” of 
identity that doesn’t speak to a will to the universal, except perhaps as it 
mocks it in its European alter-ego. 
In conclusion, let us return to the question of whether common ground 
can be found between The Other Heading and the critique of identity we 
find in recent trends in both Balkan scholarship and the Balkan popular 
imaginary. Besides challenging Europeans to consider the contribution 
to the discussion of Identity from the margins, cultural theory coming 
from the Balkans and its post–1989 diaspora is an example of how a 
response to the epistemological dominance of the West does not always 
have to include a resignation to the European intellectual trends. While 
maintaining that Derrida’s answer to the history of identification and 
identity patterns in Europe is inadequate as a model for all identity and 
is lacking even as a performative call to a new Europe, the intent and 
seriousness with which he approaches European responsibility towards 
the other can only benefit the debate on identity in Balkan scholarship. 
 
N O T E S  
[1]  I am taking this ever-present European other in the native in a limited sense 
because an argument could be made that the postcolonial (as opposed to the 
colonial) identity is precisely an assertion of agency separate from the identity of 
colonial domination. However, in theory, only a post-imperial identity could be 
fully separate from any references to the (European) colonial other. 
[2]  Radhakrishnan also makes a similar point. In addition, while I am aware of the 
deconstructionist contention that there is no binary opposition between the 
textual (or epistemological) and reality, I would contend that while we can 
perceive the textuality of everyday life we can also understand that how we 
perceive the effect of everyday life on us is not only textual (there is, after all, 
something very non-textual in our perceptions of the most extreme intrusions of 
the world upon our person, like getting shot or beaten). 
[3]  I am thinking here of, I believe, a comparable example from European history, 
namely the aftermath of World War II. While we can agree that an argument 
that would paint Nazi terror as an aberration of “European” history or that 
would attempt to rationalize or categorize the Holocaust in any other way is 
ultimately opening Europe to the possibility of repeating this history, I would still 
argue that reparations for forced labor and Holocaust crimes is still a significant 
element of Germany and Europe coming to terms with this history. 
[4]  He uses the example of a Balkanite encountering, somewhere in Western Europe 
or the US, another Balkanite and despite all apparent differences, having an “a-
ha moment” of recognition in that other person. 
[5]  Not to be outdone by his characters, Kusturica, allegedly, attended the Cannes 
film festival, where he incidentally won Palm d’Or for his masterpiece 




Underground, drunk and followed by a (typically Balkan) brass band playing loud 
gypsy music to the chagrin of the organizers and the red carpet elite.  
[6]  See especially The Bosnian Chronicle for exchanges between Westerners and locals. 
[7]  It is worthwhile noticing that Kusturica himself is an atrociously bad example of 
how to go about this. His Serbian nationalist histrionics (mostly choreographed for 
shock value itself) only alienate those on whose behalf his characters speak. That 
should not prevent us from considering his films as instructive of Balkan reality 
even if his public persona is a vulgarized version of the same.  
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